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Abstract
Many models of natural language understanding make inference decisions as they
process a text, but few models address the issue of how to correct their interpretation
when later text reveals that earher inference decisions are wrong. This paper describes
how ATLAST, amarker-passing model of text understanding, approaches this problem.
The keys to ATLAST's error recovery capability are a means for remembering the
choices it could have made but didn't, and a means for initiating the re-evaluation of
those previously rejected choices at the appropriate times. This paper also discusses
some of the arguments for and against the psychological validity ofa theory of inference
retention in human text understanding.
-This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grants IST-81-20685 and
IST-85-12419 and by the Naval Ocean Systems Center under contracts N00123-81-C-1078 and N66001-83-
C-0255.
1 Introduction
As we read, we make unconscious decisions about the meaning of ambiguous words, sen
tences, or passages based on incomplete information. Often those decisions are wrong and
we must revise our understanding of the text. For example, consider the following simple
story:
Text 1: Fred asked Wilma to marry him.
Wilma began to cry.
Interpreting this text requires that a causal relationship between Fred's proposal and
Wilma's tears be inferred. One such possible relationship is that Wilma was happy about
Fred's proposal and was crying "tears of joy." Another equally likely inference is that
Wilma was crying because she was saddened or upset by the proposal.^
Now consider this variation of Text 1:
Text 2: Fred asked Wilma to marry him.
Wilma began to cry.
She was saddened by the proposal.
Assuming that after processing the first two sentences of Text 2, the text understander
has inferred that Wilma is happy, how does the understander resolve that inference with
the contradictory third sentence?
One solution is to postpone making inferences for as long as possible so that potential
conflicts are resolved before any decisions are made. However, this solution becomes less
viable as texts increase in length. Abetter solution is to make inferences as the opportuni
ties arise, then revise initial inferences iflater text shows them to be incorrect. This paper
describes how one model of text understanding, ATLAST, simplifies the error recovery
process by remembering the alternative inferences it could have made but did not, and
reconsidering those alternatives when subsequent text suggests they might now be correct.
Most models ofnatural language understanding fail to address the problem ofrecovery
1Experimental evidence indicates that either interpretation is equally likely when this text is presented
to human subjects (Granger, Eiselt, &Holbrook, 1983; Granger &Holbrook, 1983).
from erroneous inferences, but there have been exceptions. Granger's ARTHUR (1980)
was able to supplant incorrect inferences by using a map of pointers to all of the inferences
generated during the processing ofa text, whether or not they appeared in the final rep
resentation. O'Rorke (1983) proposed a design for a story understander called RESUND
that used non-monotonic dependencies to correct false assumptions. Norvig's FAUSTUS
(1983) temporarily stored rejected inferences using a process similar to the retention pro
cess discussed in this paper. FAUSTUS represented inferences as frames, and rejected
frames were stored in a separate data base in case later text forced revision of earlier de
cisions. While previous papers on ATLAST have discussed how it makes decisions in the
face of ambiguity (Eiselt, 1985; Granger, Eiselt, & Holbrook, 1986), this is the first paper
to describe how ATLAST revises the interpretation when its decisions are contradicted by
later text.
2 How it works
ATLAST's ability to revise its original interpretation in the face of new information de
pends upon two features: the ability to remember inference paths that it originally decided
should not be part of its interpretation of the input text, and a mechanism for recogniz
ing when these rejected paths should be reconsidered. Explaining how this works will be
facilitated by a brief summary of the relevant aspects of ATLAST's architecture and the
assumptions under which it runs.
2.1 Architecture and assumptions
ATLAST uses marker-passing to search a relational network for pathswhich connect mean
ings of open-class words from the input text. Asingle path is a chain of nodes, representing
objects or events, connected by links, corresponding to relationships between the nodes.
Any nodes in a path which are not explicitly mentioned in the text are events or objects
which are inferred; therefore, these paths are called inference paths. A set ofinference paths
which joins allofthe words in the text into a connected graphrepresents one possible inter
pretation of the text. In this respect ATLAST resembles a number of other models of text
understanding that utilize marker-passing or spreading activation (e.g., Charniak, 1983;
Cottrell, 1984; Hirst, 1984; Quillian, 1969; Riesbeck & Martin, 1986; Waltz & Pollack,
1984). The paths which form the current interpretation are called active paths.
For any given text, however, there may be a great number of possible interpretations,
many of which are nonsensical. The problem then is determining which of the possible
interpretations provides the best explanation ofthe text. ATLAST deals with this problem
by applying inference evaluation metrics. These metrics are used to compare two competing
inference paths and select the more appropriate one. Two inference paths compete when
they connect the same two nodes in the relational network via different combinations of
links and nodes. The path that fits better with the current interpretation is activated (i.e.,
it becomes part of the interpretation). The other path is de-activated but not discarded.
Instead, that pathis retained in order to facilitate error recovery as described in Subsection
2.2. The choice of one inference path over another is made as soon as ATLAST discovers
that the two paths compete; ATLAST does not postpone inference decisions. As the
marker-passing search mechanism finds more paths, ATLAST constructs aninterpretation
consisting of those paths which survive the evaluation process. When the marker-passing
and evaluation processes end, the surviving active paths make up the final interpretation
of the text.
Before they are even considered by the evaluation process, however, paths proposed
by the marker-passing search process must pass minimum acceptability requirements. For
example, ATLAST will ignore paths which contain cycles. Another example is that paths
which connect components of different sentences (which ATLAST naively assumes to rep
resent different states orevents) must contain links denoting a causal relationship between
the sentences (cf. Schank &Abelson, 1977). These constraints, along with a limit on the
spread of marker passings serve to limit combinatorial growth ofthe number of paths that
could be discovered and evaluated.
In theory, the search for inference paths and their evaluation take place simultaneously.
In practice, though, ATLAST simulates this concurrency by alternating between marker-
passing and path evaluation. During each of these cycles, a new word is read from the
input, its meanings are recalled and marked, and all markers in the network are passed
a fixed distance. Any path discovered in this way is then examined to see if it competes
with an active path in the interpretation as it stands at that time. If so, the evaluation
metrics are applied and a choice between the two competing paths is made.
2.2 Retention and re-evaluation
Thetwo keys to error recovery in ATLAST arethe retention ofpreviously rejected inference
paths and the ability to re-evaluate possibly relevant retained paths at the appropriate
times. Without a mechanismfor knowing when and how to re-evaluate the retained paths,
the retention feature alone provides no benefit.
There are two ways in which the re-evaluation ofa retained path can be initiated. The
first is through direct rediscovery of the retained path by the search process. Because
the passing of markers begins in different places at different times during the processing
of text, the same inference path may be discovered (or more appropriately, rediscovered)
more than once. If a rediscovered path is not currently part of ATLAST's interpretation
of the text (i.e., the path has been discovered earlier, rejected by the evaluation metrics,
but retained), that path is re-evaluated against the competing path which is part of the
interpretation. This rediscovery process initiates reconsideration of some of the retained
paths, but it is not dependent upon retention because these paths would be reconsidered
even if they had not been retained.
Some retained paths, though, will not be rediscovered, but the inferences made from
later text may change the interpretation in such a way that these paths now should be
included. ATLAST uses a method of "piggy-backing" the re-evaluation of these paths
onto the evaluation of paths which are directly discovered or rediscovered by the search
process. If a (re)discovered path is evaluated against a competing path in the current
interpretation, any subpaths or superpaths of the (re)discovered path are also evaluated
against the current interpretation. In this way, ATLAST attempts to limit re-evaluation to
those paths that are currently relevant. (While constraining reconsideration to just those
paths that completely contain or are completely contained by the (re)discovered path
works for the example of Section 3, it has. proven to be too restrictive for another text.
In that case, one retained path which should have been part of the final representation
was neither directly nor indirectly chosen for re-evaluation. Future work with ATLAST
will include relaxing this constraint to see if its error recovery ability can be improved
while still avoiding the re-evaluation of every retained path on every cycle.) Without the
ability to force re-evaluation of paths rejected early in processing but not rediscovered
later, ATLAST's final'interpretation probably will be incorrect. Indirectly initiating the
re-evaluation of previously rejected inference paths is essential to ATLAST s error recovery
capability and is dependent upon inference retention.
2.3 The three steps to error recovery
Another way to view error recovery is as a three-step process (Norvig, 1983). The three
steps are (1) recognizing that an error has occurred, (2) locating the source of the error,
and (3) correcting the error. From this perspective, ATLAST's operation can be described
as follows:
• Recognizing that an error has occurred: Each inference path has only two endpoints,
and for any two given endpoints there will be at most one active inference path
between them. When a new path is discovered (or an old path is rediscovered), the
set of currently active paths is searched for a path which shares the same endpoints.
If such a path exists, it is possible that the currently active path was incorrectly,
included in the representation of the text.
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Figure 1: The organization of nodes in the memory structure for Text 3.
Propose-
Marriage
Locating the source of the error: This step is effectively subsumed by the previous
one. If competition between inference paths has been detected, the competition wiU
always be between a path which is currently part of the representation and one which
is not. If an error has in fact occurred, the source of the error will be the currently
active path.
Correcting the error: The competing paths are evaluated in thecontext of thecurrent
interpretation of the text (minus the active path being evaluated). The path which is
more appropriate to the current interpretation is added to the interpretation, while
the less appropriate path is added to the set of retained paths. If the interpretation
changed as a result, then an error has been detected, located, and corrected.
3 ATLAST in action
An example of ATLAST processing a simple but potentially misleading text will illustrate
the program's capacity for error recovery. This section describes the operation of ATLAST
as it arrives at an interpretation for a simplified version of Text 2:
Text 3: Fred proposed.
Wilma cried.
Wilma was sad.
Although this is a simplified version of the original text (because ATLAST's syntactic
abilities are limited), the relevant inference decisions should be the same for both texts. In
the following example, many of the steps are left out for the sake of brevity (e.g., simple
syntactic analysis and thematic role binding). The corresponding memory structure is
shown in Figure 1.
As ATLAST reads the first sentence from left to right, it finds a path from proposed
to Fred. At this point, there is no candidate interpretation for the text, thus no competing
inference paths, so this path becomes the first member of the set of active paths:
New path discovered: pathO
Path from PROPDSE-MARRIAGE to FRED
PRQPOSE-MARRIAGE has the role-filler GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FRED
Activating: pathO
While processing the second sentence of the text, ATLAST finds a path denoting a
causal relationship between proposed and cried. This path represents the inference that
the crying results from a state of happiness which in turn results from the proposal of
marriage. This path is added to the set of active paths:
New path discovered: path4
Path from CRY-TEARS to PRQPOSE-MARRIAGE
CRY-TEARS is a result of HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is a result of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the instance PRQPOSE-MARRIAGE
Activating: path4
Next, ATLAST discovers a path which provides an alternate interpretation to that offered
by the previous path. During this example, ATLAST was instructed to give preference to
older paths over newer paths when no other evaluation metric was able to make a decision.^
Thus, the newer path is not added to the set of active paths:
New path discovered: pathS
Path from CRY-TEARS to PRQPOSE-MARRIAGE
CRY-TEARS is a result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is a result of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the instance PRQPOSE-MARRIAGE
Perseverer metric — path4 older than pathS
De-activating: pathS
^This tendency to prefer older inferences over newer ones results horn the work on differences in human
inference decision behavior noted in the previous footnote. The theory that was proposed to explain the
differences suggests that some subjects prefer older inferences when faced with a choice between competing
inferences, while other subjects prefer newer inferences. The people who prefer older inferences are called
"perseverers" while those who prefer newer inferences are called "recencies." ATLAST is capable of modeling
either kind of behavior by changing one of its evaluation metrics; it recovers from erroneous inferences in
either mode.
ATLAST now finds a path which connects cried to Wilma and adds it to the set of active
paths:
New path discovered: path9
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMA
CRY-TEARS is a result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HTJMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMA
Activating: path9
The interpretation now contains three paths: path 0, path 4, and path 9. There is a se
mantic contradiction among the active paths at this time in that path 9 is an inference that
Wilma cried because she was sad while path 4 says that the tears were shed due to a state
of happiness induced by the marriage proposal. ATLAST does not notice the contradiction
because the two paths are not competing paths. This is the best interpretation based on
the paths discovered so far. During the same cycle, a competing pathfrom Wilma to cried
is found. This new path, path 11, shares more nodes with other active paths than does its
competing path, path 9; this is one criteria which ATLAST employs to decide which path
explains more of the input. In this case, path 11 explains more input so it is added to the
set of active paths and path 9 is moved to the set of retained paths:
New path discovered: pathll
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMA
CRY-TEARS is a result of HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is eui instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMA
More-reinforcement metric — pathll has more shared nodes than path9
De-activating: path9
Activating: pathll
As the final sentence is processed, ATLAST discovers a path connecting proposed to
sad. This path is added to the set of active paths. In addition, this new path has three
superpaths among the set of retained paths, and these paths are re-evaluated. One of
these superpaths, path 5, is now preferred over the active path 4 because it is reinforced
by path 15 (i.e., it contains the active path 15 as a subpath). Path 4 is moved from the
set of active paths to the retained paths, and path 5 is moved from the retained paths to
the active paths:
New path discovered: pathlS
Path from SAD-STATE to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
SAD-STATE is a result of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the instance PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Also reconsidering: (pathiO pathS path2)
Activating: pathlS
Shorter-path metric— path4 shorter than pathlO
De-activating: pathlO
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes than path4
De-activating: path4
Activating: pathS
Shorter-path metric — pathO shorter than path2
De-activating: path2
The previous step demonstrates the need for inference path retention. Path 5 has been
found directly several times prior to this point, hlach time, the evaluation metrics have
determined that path 4 fit better /with the context. Now that path 15 is part of that
context, path 5 is determined to be more appropriate than path 4. Had path 5 not been
retained after being rejected earlier, it could not have been reconsidered at this time, nor
would it ever have been reconsidered because the search process will not find path 5 again.
If path 5had not been retained, path 4would incorrectly end up in the final representation
of the story. Infact, this is what happens when ATIAST's retention capability is disabled
while processing Text 3.
Continuing with the example, ATLAST finds a new path from cried to sad and adds
it to the active paths:
New path discovered: pathlS
Path from SAD-STATE to CRY-TEARS
SAD-STATE has the result CRY-TEARS
Also reconsidering: (pathlS pathlS)
Activating: pathlS
Shorter-path metric — pathlS shorter than pathlS
De-activating: pathlS
Shorter-path metric — pathll shorter than pathl3
De-activating: pathl3
ATLAST then discovers the last new path to be added to the set of active paths. This path
connects Wilma and sad. This new path also forces the reconsideration of one retained
superpath, path 9, which is now preferred over its old competitor, path 11, because path 9
now shares more nodes with other active paths than does path 11. Path 9 is returned
to the set of active paths and path 11 becomes a retained path, again illustrating the
usefulness of inference retention:
New path discovered: path20
Path from SAD-STATE to WILMA
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMA
Also reconsidering: (path9)
Activating: path20
More-reinforcement metric — path9 has more shared nodes theui pathll
De-activating: pathll
Activating: path9
The marker-passing mechanism will uncover nine more new paths to be considered, and
rediscover many others, which will in turn force the re-evaluation of a number of retained
subpaths and superpaths of those paths. However, none of these paths will be incorporated
into the final interpretation of the text, which follows:
Active memory structure:
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMA
CRY-TEARS is a result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMA
Path from SAD-STATE to WILMA
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMA
Path from SAD-STATE to CRY-TEARS
SAD-STATE has the result CRY-TEARS
Path from CRY-TEARS to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
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CRY-TEARS is a result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is a result of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the instance PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Path from SAD-STATE to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
SAD-STATE is a result of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the instance PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to FRED
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE has the role-filler GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FRED
The evaluation metrics used in this example, with the exception of the perseverer
metric, all represent attempts to quantify different aspects of the principle of parsimony:
explaining the greatest amount of input text with the least amount of representation.
Variations of this principle have been employed by a number of diverse models of language
understanding, including those ofGrain and Steedman (1985), Granger (1980), Kay (1983),
McDermott (1974), Quillian (1969), and Wilks (1978).
4 Retention issues
The principle ofretaining rejected inference paths is inspired by experimental work which
has led to a theory of lexical disambiguation called conditional retention (Granger, Hol-
brook, & Eiselt, 1984). According to this theory, lexical disambiguation is an automatic
process in which all meanings of an ambiguous word are retrievedj the meaning most
appropriate to the preceding context is chosen, and the other meanings are temporarily
retained. In the case where the ambiguous word appears within a short text, the mean
ings are retained until the end of the text. Should later text contradict the initially chosen
meaning, the retained meanings for that word are reconsidered in light of the updated con
text, and a new meaning is selected without repeating the lexical retrieval process. The
theory of conditional retention thus offers an explanation of how readers can recover from
an incorrect choice of word meaning without reprocessing the text. Because the choice of
a word meaning will affect the inferences which are made during the understanding of a
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text, the theory of conditional retention has implications for making inference decisions
at levels above the lexical level. Following this assumption, ATLAST uses the inference
retention mechanism described in Sections 2 and 3 to recover from both incorrect lexical
inferences (i.e., choices ofword meaning) as well as erroneous pragmatic inferences.
However, the theory of conditional retention is by no means widely accepted, and the
criticisms of conditional retention should be taken into consideration when evaluating AT-
LAST's utility as a cognitive model. One argument against conditional retention is a large
body ofexperimental evidence which shows that, almost immediately after a meaning of an
ambiguous word has been selected, the alternate meanings seem as if they had never been
recalled (e.g., Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Bienkowski, 1982; Tanenhaus, Leiman,
& Seidenberg, 1979). This has been interpreted by some as proof that retention does not
occur. On the other hand, these experiments were not specifically designed to look for evi
dence ofretention. Also, as shown by Holbrook, Eiselt, Granger, and Matthei (to appear),
the results of some experiments (e.g., Hudson & Tanenhaus, 1984) can be interpreted in
such a way as to support the theory of conditional retention, though not conclusively. The
one experiment to date which was designed to look for retention (Granger, Holbrook, &
Eiselt, 1984) also yielded inconclusive results.
A frequent and deserved criticism of the conditional retention theory is that it offers
no concrete answer to the question of how long alternate choices are retained; it says only
that the choices are retained until the end of the text if the text is short. The experiment
described by Granger, Holbrook, and Eiselt (1984) did not address this issue, but recent
tests with ATLAST may point the way to an answer. In these tests, ATLAST was modified
so that a path was given a time stamp indicating the cycle during which it was added to
the set ofretained paths. In addition, a limit was established on the number ofcycles that
a path could be retained without being reconsidered. Thus, a path retained on the first
cycle, for example, was deleted from the set of retained paths if that path had not been
re-evaluated by the end of the third cycle. Ifthe path had been re-evaluated in that time
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but had not been added to the current interpretation, it was given an updated time stamp
and returned to the set of retained paths.
While the example text of Section 3 was run without time stamps or limits, subsequent
tests on this text, which consists of two two-word sentences and one three-word sentence,
revealed that a minimum limit on retention of two cycles was sufficient to enable ATLAST
to arrive at the same representation as that found in the example of Section 3. In a
test with another text consisting of a five-word sentence followed by a four-word sentence,
the minimum limit was four cycles. Obviously, there are too few data points to draw
any conclusions, and the units of measure (e.g., cycles and words) are almost too coarse
to be useful, but there is the slightest hint of a correlation between the amount of time
that inferences are retained and the length of sentences in the text. Further work with
ATLAST along these lines may lead to predictions that the duration of retention is tied
to structural cues such as clause boundaries, or that the duration is independent of syntax
and is controlled by the number of paths being retained, just to name two possibilities. In
any case, if interesting predictions do arise from work with the model, it may be possible
to test these predictions in the laboratory with human subjects.
Another problem with the conditional retention theory is that it assumes human readers
recover from errors without backtracking and rereading the text. However, as Carpenter
and Daneman (1981) demonstrate through studies of eye fixations of human subjects while
reading, there are texts and conditions which cause a reader to backtrack when a semantic
inconsistency is discovered in an ambiguous text. Carpenter and Daneman s error recovery
heuristics include checking previous words that caused processing difficulty. The problem
then becomes one of how to find the words that caused the inconsistency. Carpenter
and Daneman state that their data allow for a model which utilizes memory of previous
decisions, though this is not the only interpretation they offer (p. 152). Thus, while
ATLAST differs in many ways from the model of Carpenter and Daneman, especially in
regard to the issue of reprocessing the input text, the latter model at least recognizes the
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plausibility of the principle of retention in explaining a reader's ability to recover from
incorrect inferences made while reading misleading text.
5 Conclusion
The principle of retaining rejected inference paths within the larger framework of a rela
tional network provides a simple but effective mechanism for recovering from erroneous
inferences during text understanding, but only if there is a way to locate and re-evaluate
the retained paths at the appropriate times.
From a practical perspective, the principle ofinference retention could be incorporated
into new or existing text understanding systems in order to enable them to correct erro
neous decisions. From a cognitive modeling perspective, however, the jury is still out on
the issue of inference retention. While a model like ATLAST demonstrates the plausibility
of the theory, only psycholinguistic experiments designed specifically to test for retention
will be able to confirm or deny the validity of the theory.
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